

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War 24 October, 1943 — File No. 19

7

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]				
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	memo	DepSecDef to NSC Intel. Committee	10/23/73	B
2	report	Intelligence Information Cable	10/24/73	B
3	reports	Situation Reports	10/24/73	B
4	brief	re: Soviet Airlift Flights	10/24/73	B
5	brief	USSR- Middle East	10/24/73	B
6	report	Intelligence Information Cable	10/24/73	B
7	cable	from DIRNSA	10/24/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1175	
FOLDER TITLE (7)				

RESTRICTION CODES

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War
X M. L. Congressional
HHS
DA
you

ACTION
5877 (Revised)

SECRET (GDS)

October 24, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President in His
Meeting with the Bipartisan Leadership,
October 25, 1973, 8:30 a.m.

Attached at Tab A for your approval are talking points for the President to use in his meeting with the Bipartisan Leadership of Congress. They are designed simply as an introduction for your substantive briefing.

At Tab B are suggested main points for your briefing.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the talking points at Tab A.

SECRET (GDS)

WBQ:HHS:amt 10/24/73

5877 (Revised)

MEETING WITH BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP

Thursday, October 25, 1973

8:30 a.m. (1 hour)

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To brief the bipartisan leadership of Congress on the current situation in the Middle East. You last met with them on the Middle East on October 10, 1973.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

A. **Background:** Fighting broke out in the Middle East on October 6, resulting in limited Egyptian and Syrian gains in the first few days. We asked for a meeting of the Security Council on October 8. Ambassador Scalaputo put forward a general position favoring return to the ceasefire lines, but no resolutions were offered. By October 10, the Israelis had succeeded in breaking through on the Syrian front and spent the next few days consolidating their position there. That same day, October 10, the Soviets began a large-scale airlift to Syria and Egypt. On October 13, under heavy Arab pressure, King Hussein sent an armored brigade to Syria. The following day the Egyptian army launched an offensive, which the Israelis managed to meet and turn back. That same day, October 14, our airlift to Israel was begun. On October 16, the day of Premier Kossygin's trip to Cairo, the Israelis made a limited crossing of the Suez Canal to the west bank. This was followed on October 17 by very heavy fighting on the Suez front. That same day you met with four Arab foreign ministers; the Arab oil exporters decided on a cutback in production; and Kuwait restored its \$42 million subsidy to Jordan. By October 18 the Israelis had built up a sizable force on the west bank of the Canal and were on the offensive. On October 19 you asked Congress for \$2.2 billion in aid for Israel. That same day, the Soviet leadership requested that you send me to Moscow and I departed early the next morning. The following

day King Faisal announced that oil shipments to the US would be blocked, which led all other Arab oil producers to take the same step. In Moscow, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire, and early in the morning of October 22 the Security Council passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire, implementation of Resolution 242, and peace negotiations. The ceasefire went into effect twelve hours later, although fighting continued for another day, leaving the Israelis in a strong position on the west bank of the Canal. On October 23 another ceasefire resolution was passed by the Security Council. The Egyptians have called a Security Council meeting for tonight to deal with alleged Israeli violations of the ceasefire.

- B. Participants: Bipartisan Leadership of Congress, Secretary Kissinger and key members of White House staff.
- C. Press Plan: Meeting to be announced. Press photo opportunity.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. I want to give you some background on how things stand in the Middle East. As you know, I asked Secretary Kissinger to go to Moscow last Saturday in response to a request by General-Secretary Brezhnev.
2. The meetings in Moscow achieved our basic objective of getting agreement on a ceasefire and establishing a basis for moving forward on the diplomatic front toward a general peace settlement.
3. Despite two ceasefire resolutions, some fighting has continued and we are trying to bring this rapidly to an end.
4. I would like to ask Secretary Kissinger to give you a more complete rundown of developments.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 5877

SECRET (GDS)

October 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*
WILLIAM B. QUANDT *W B Q*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Meeting with Bipartisan
Leadership of Congress, October 24, 1973,
8:30 a.m.

The Congressional Leadership will be particularly interested in learning the results of your trip to Moscow and Israel and to get a sense for the next steps on the diplomatic front that you may have in mind. You will want to make clear that we have not changed our interpretation of UN Resolution 242 and that last Sunday's ceasefire resolution calls for negotiations between the parties to the conflict, which is a significant step in gaining acceptance of the US (and Israeli) position that a peace agreement must be worked out in negotiation.

Talking Points

--I would like to bring you up to date on our diplomatic efforts. Last Friday, General-Secretary Brezhnev asked the President to send me to Moscow to talk about the Middle East crisis. The Soviet leaders were seriously interested in achieving a ceasefire promptly, and we managed to reach rapid agreement on the principles that became the basis for the UN Security Council Resolution late Sunday night.

--Our ability to deal directly and rapidly with Soviet leaders on a critical issue is a vindication of what we have been trying to achieve in the last two years.

--The Soviets obviously believed that the situation in the Middle East was jeopardizing detente and apparently decided to make concessions on the Middle East rather than face a severe worsening of our relations.

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

--In other words, vested interests in US-Soviet relations created by the 1972 and 1973 summit meetings worked in our favor at a critical moment.

--The major points in that resolution are that there should be a ceasefire; that UN resolution 242 should be implemented in all its parts; and that there should be negotiations between the parties under appropriate international auspices leading to a just and durable peace.

--The key point, of course, is that negotiations are to take place between the parties.

--I told the Israeli leaders during my stop in Tel Aviv that we have not changed our view of the meaning of Resolution 242. It embodies general principles that should govern a peace settlement, but negotiations will be required to determine the final contents of a settlement. We have in mind that the parties should negotiate directly, with some involvement at appropriate times by the US and USSR.

--We have no fixed plan on how negotiations should proceed. For the moment, we want to get the fighting ended. Once that happens, we will address other issues such as arms supplies, on which no agreements have been reached, and issues of how to begin peace talks.

--Let me add a few words about why we believe it is important that the ceasefire be followed by negotiations leading toward a peace settlement. This recent round of hostilities has demonstrated the fragility of ceasefire arrangements that are not linked to a broader effort to reach a peace settlement. If this round of hostilities is not followed by a settlement, there is no reason that war could not occur again, perhaps on a larger and more costly scale. Therefore, we think the time is right for a serious peace effort that will reduce the future chances of war.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 075

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01195 01 OF 02 241455Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4606
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 JERUSALEM 1195

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS, SY, UN
SUBJECT: UNTSO OPERATION ON SUEZ FRONT; POSSIBLE NEW GOLAN OPERATION

SUMMARY: UNTSO SOURCE (PROTECT FULLY) REPORTS EGYPTIANS BEGAN
URGING UNTSO SEND IN OBSERVERS DURING AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23.
WHEN INSTRUCTIONS FINALLY CAME MORNING OF FOLLOWING DAY TO
SET UP OBSERVER OPERATION, DAYAN DESIGNATED POINTS FOR STATIC
OPS, ALL BUT ONE LYING ALONG ISRAELI BULGE INTO EGYPT. (OTHER
IS IN NORTH OPPOSITE PORT SAID.) NO OPS PLANNED AS OF NOW
FOR EAST BANK, THOUGH QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED. OBSERVERS
SHOULD BE IN PLACE BY 1500 LOCAL OCTOBER 24. SYRIANS HAVE
ALERTED UNTSO THAT THEY MAY REQUEST OBSERVERS ON GOLAN FRONT
AS WELL. END SUMMARY

1. SENIOR UNTSO SOURCE (PROTECT FULLY) GAVE ME FOLLOWING
RUN DOWN ON SETTING UP OBSERVER OPERATION IN SUEZ AREA. KEY
DETAILS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN PRESS, BUT BACKGROUND MAY BE
OF INTEREST.

2. EGYPTIANS BEGAN PRESSING UNTSO TO PUT OBSERVERS ONTO SUEZ
FRONT AS EARLY AS MID-AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23. ACTING FONMIN

WALSH
HOLLOM
HUTTENBACH
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEWIS
LEVINE
NESSOPORTE
OCEEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELDT
V.I.G.
WALSH

R/B



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 01195 01 OF 02 241455Z

FAHMY IMPLORING UNTSO REP IN CAIRO TO THIS EFFECT AND REP'S CABLE REACHED UNTSO HERE ABOUT 1600 LOCAL. UNTSO HAD CLEAR IMPRESSION EGYPTIANS DISMAYED BY PROGRESS ISRAELIS WERE MAKING ON GROUND. FURTHER EGYPTIANS APPEALS RECEIVED DURING EARLY MORNING LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 24, PRIOR TO THE WORKING OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAELIS. UNTSO SIMPLY BUCKED REQUESTS TO NEW YORK. EVEN FOLLOWING SUBSEQUENT WORKING OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH BOTH SIDES, EGYPTIANS BEGAN TO INQUIRE WHY UNTSO NOT MOVING MORE QUICKLY. SOURCE HAD UNEASY IMPRESSION THAT EGYPTIANS MIGHT IN SOME WAY ATTEMPT TO FIX ON UNTSO PART OF BLAME FOR WHAT HE SAID WAS CLEARLY MILITARY DEBACLE FOR EGYPTIANS.

3. COFS SIILASVOU SAW DAYAN AT 0645 LOCAL AFTER EGYPTIANS HAD AGREED TO CEASEFIRE TIMETABLE. DAYAN WAS VERY CORDIAL, APPEARED TO WELCOME UNTSO ROLE. DAYAN NOTED THAT RESOLUTION 339 HAD REFERRED TO UTILIZING OBSERVERS THEN IN CAIRO, AND PROPOSED THAT THEY BE SENT TO SPECIFIC POINTS ALONG PERIMETER OF ISRAELI BULGE INTO WEST BANK (SIX WERE SETTLED UPON.) HE SAID ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE AT THOSE POINTS PREPARED TO MEET UNTSO PERSONNEL. POINTS LIE ON LONG ARC WITH NORTHERN OBSERVER POST AT ISMAILIA AND SOUTHERN ONE NEAR GULF OF SUEZ SOUTH OF PORT (PRESUMABLY ADABIYA). POINTS APPEAR TO BE KEY COMMUNICATIONS JUNCTIONS AND OTHER IMPORTANT GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES. A SEVENTH POST WAS AGREED TO ON EAST BANK OPPOSITE PORT SAID.

4. QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING OBSERVER POSTS AROUND EGYPTIAN PERIMETER ON EAST BANK WAS LEFT FOR LATER. DAYAN, SOURCE COMMENTED, SEEMED RELUCTANT TO GET INTO THIS QUESTION. UNTSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING KANTARA CONTROL CENTER ON EAST BANK--UNTSO POST RAHBA--AND SENDING OBSERVERS FROM THERE TO MAN SOME WEST BANK POSTS. ISRAELIS PUT UNTSO OFF BY SAYING CANAL BRIDGES TOO CLOGGED WITH TRAFFIC. UNTSO WAS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELIS WANTED OBSERVERS POSTS AROUND FARTHEST EXTENT OF ISRAELI PENETRATION BUT WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO HAVE THEM ON ANY LINE WITHIN THAT PERIMETER, SUCH AS EGYPTIAN EAST BANK ENCLAVES. UNTSO IS NOW AWAITING ISRAELI RESPONSE TO ITS SPECIFIC REQUEST TO REACTIVATE RAHBA.

5. AS OF NOW, IT IS INTENDED THAT POSTS BE STATIC IN CHARACTER, THOUGH POSSIBILITY OF MOBILE PATROLS IS NOT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 JERUSA 01195 01 OF 02 241455Z

RULED OUT. SOURCE WAS INCLINED TO BELIEVE MOBILE PATROLS WOULD PRESENT REAL PROBLEM, SINCE DAYAN POINTED OUT THERE WERE ONLY IMAGINARY LINES BETWEEN POINTS WHICH HE INDICATED. WITHIN THESE IMAGINARY LINES WERE OBVIOUSLY POCKETS OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS. IN FACT, GOE HAD URGED UNTSU EARLY OCTOBER 24, ONCE OPERATION AGREED TO, TO SEEK OUT THESE EGYPTIAN FORCES AND SECURE THEIR ESCAPE FROM ENTRAPMENT. UNTSU BUCKED THIS REQUEST TO NEW YORK AS WELL, AND FEELS THE JOB WOULD BE WELL BEYOND ITS CAPABILITY AND MANDATE.
DAY

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SECRET 005

PAGE 01 JERUSA 01195 02 OF 02 241459Z

41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 JERUSALEM 1195
EXDIS

6. EACH POST WILL BE MANNED FOR TIME BEING BY TWO OBSERVERS AND RADIO EQUIPPED JEEP. CENTRAL RADIO CONTROL CENTER BEING SET UP AGAIN IN ISMAILIA TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH POSTS. SOURCE ESTIMATED OBSERVERS BEGAN ARRIVING AT THEIR POSTS BY 1300 LOCAL AND WOULD ALL BE IN PLACE BY ABOUT 1500. EACH POST ACCOMPANIED BY EGYPTIAN LIAISON OFFICER. SOURCE THOUGHT IT LIKELY OBSERVERS WOULD NOT PROCEED THROUGH EGYPTIAN LINES TO MAKE CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS SINCE HE DOUBTED EGYPTIANS WOULD PERMIT THIS. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MIGHT NOT IN ALL CASES BE EGYPTIAN FORCES IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY AND OPS WOULD THEN TOUCH BASE WITH ISRAELIS. DAYAN HAD PROVIDED GUARANTEES FOR SAFETY OF EGYPTIAN OFFICERS INVOLVED.

7. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF OBSERVERS WOULD BE SAME AS HITHERTO: OBSERVE AND REPORT CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. SUCH QUESTIONS AS CONTROLLING FOOD AND WATER SUPPLY MOVEMENTS TO EGYPTIAN FORCE TRAPPED ON SOUTHERN END OF EAST BANK HAD NOT COME UP AND SOURCE HAD NO IDEA HOW THAT WOULD BE HANDLED. HE WONDERED IF RED CROSS MIGHT NOT DEAL WITH IT.

8. UNTSO HAS ALERTED NEW YORK THAT IT MIGHT REQUEST AS MANY AS 45 MORE OBSERVERS TO HANDLE SUEZ FRONT. SOURCE RECALLED THAT INCREASE IN NUMBER OF OBSERVERS TENDS TO RAISE QUESTION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, WHICH COULD BE STICKY. HE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 JERUSA 01195 02 OF 02 241459Z

ASSUMED, LEAVING THIS PROBLEM ASIDE, THAT ANY NEW OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM NON-NATO COUNTRIES GIVEN EGYPTIAN SENSITIVITIES ON THIS POINT.

9. ON GOLAN FRONT, EIGHT OPERATING OPS ARE STILL IN EFFECT MONITORING CEASEFIRE. UNTSO REPRESENTATIVE IN DAMASCUS WAS ALERTED BY SYRIAN LIAISON OFFICER THAT SYRIA MIGHT REQUEST OBSERVERS ALONG ENTIRE FRONT. UNTSO WOULD PROBABLY THEN RE-SHUFFLE SOME OF ITS PRESENT POSTS, TO PROVIDE MORE EVEN COVERAGE WHERE FRONT RUNS ALONG OLD CEASEFIRE LINE, AND USE REMAINDER OF GOLAN OBSERVERS TO COVER ISRAELI SALIENT. SOURCE WAS AWARE THAT OPS HAD NOT CAUGHT SOME OF OCTOBER 23 AIR AND TANK ACTION, AND REALIZED PRESENT DISTRIBUTION MIGHT NOT BE SATISFACTORY EVEN ON OLD LINE. UNTSO MIGHT NOT NEED ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS FOR SYRIAN AREA.

10. COMMENT: AS ISRAELIS HAVE ARRANGED MATTERS, THE ONLY LINE OF OBSERVERS WILL BE ALONG THEIR FARTHEST PERIMETER OF PENE- TRATION. EGYPTIAN POSTS ON WEST BANK COME THEREFORE TO APPEAR AS ENCLAVES WITHIN CONTINUOUS ISRAELI-HELD TERRITORY ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH. SIZE OF ISRAELI BULGE, WHICH SOURCE DESCRIBED AS IMMENSE, DWARFS EGYPTIAN-HELD AREAS AND FURTHER ADDS TO THIS IMPRESSION. IT IS NOT CLEAR YET WHETHER ISRAELIS REALLY INTEND THIS AS FINAL ARRANGEMENT. PRESUMABLY EGYPTIANS WILL IN ANY CASE CATCH ONTO WHAT ISRAELIS HAVE DONE AND INSIST ON DEMARCATING THEIR EAST BANK LINE AS CEASEFIRE LINE ALSO.

NOT TO DO SO WOULD SEEM TO PUT UN STAMP ON ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS. (REPORTED EGYPTIAN ATTACK TOWARD JIDI AND MITLA PASES--TEL AVIV DAO 241255Z--MAY WELL FORCE THIS ISSUE.) DAY

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L. L.

NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS
OF UNSC PREPARING
RESOLUTION TO CREATE
UN MIDDLE EAST PEACE-
KEEPING FORCE.

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RNR227

URGENT*****MIDEAST FOURTH NIGHTLEAD COUNCIL (RNR221)

BY MICHAEL LITTLEJOHNS

UNITED NATIONS, OCT. 24, REUTER--NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE PREPARING A DRAFT RESOLUTION
TONIGHT TO PAVE THE WAY FOR THE CREATION OF A U.N. MIDDLE
EAST PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.

DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID THE GROUP HOPED TO SUBMIT ITS
PROPOSALS TO THE COUNCIL FOR CONSIDERATION OVERNIGHT, WITH A VOTE
COMING TOMORROW.

PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS ON THE TEXT WERE HELD DURING A
PROLONGED SUSPENSION OF THE COUNCIL'S DEBATE ON NEW EGYPTIAN
CHARGES THAT ISRAEL HAD VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR
IN TWO RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED YESTERDAY AND ON MONDAY.

INFORMED SOURCES SAID THE PROPOSAL WAS TO HAVE THE
COUNCIL DECIDE TO ESTABLISH AN EMERGENCY FORCE, AND INSTRUCT
SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM TO SUBMIT A BLUEPRINT FOR
ITS COMPOSITION AND OPERATIONS.

THE PLAN COUNTERED EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT'S
SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION INTERPOSE THEIR
OWN FORCES IN THE AREA.

THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS, ALREADY SCEPTICAL OF
THE SUPER-POWERS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRISIS, WERE SAID TO BE
OPPOSED TO THE SADAT PLAN.

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.N. FORCE
WAS UNCERTAIN, BUT THE CHINESE WERE NOT EXPECTED TO EXERCISE THEIR
VETO IF EGYPT AND SYRIA CAME OUT IN FAVOUR OF THE IDEA.

THE MEETING WAS SUSPENDED AFTER THE UNITED STATES HAD
REJECTED THE EGYPTIAN SUGGESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION JOIN FORCES TO SUPERVISE A MIDDLE
EAST CEASEFIRE.

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 196

24 Oct

PAGE 01 PARIS 27643 241914Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 AF-10 NEA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 DRC-01 /157 W
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R 241807Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4300
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USUN NEW YORK 6577

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 27643

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, FR, XF, UN
SUBJECT: ME: FRENCH VIEWS OCTOBER 23

SUMMARY: KEY OBJECTIVES OF FRENCH ME POSITION CURRENTLY
INCLUDE GETTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACCEPTED AS THE
"APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND
ASSURING FRANCE A "GREAT POWER" ROLE IN THE PROCESS. END SUMMARY

1. READING FROM INSTRUCTIONS TO FRENCH PERMREP TO UN
DE GUIRINGAUD, QUAI ME DEPUTY DIRECTOR ROUILLON (PROTECT)
TOLD EMBOFF OCTOBER 23 ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF GOF POSITION
UNDERLYING GOF STATEMENT DURING UNSC CONSIDERATION OF
RESOLUTION 338. SIX ELEMENTS WERE:

A. DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS OF OVER-ALL
SETTLEMENT.

B. "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" MUST BE UNDER
AEGIS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

C. WITHDRAWAL MEANS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.

D. THE "GREAT POWERS" (UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS,

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 27643 241914Z

PRESUMABLY MINUS CHINA) HAVE ESSENTIAL ROLE IN SETTLEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ("REGLEMENT ET APPLICATIONS")

E. US AND SOVIETS HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE PARTIES TO BRING ABOUT EFFECTIVE SETTLEMENT.

F. "MASSIVE" DELIVERIES OF ARMS MUST CEASE.

2. ROUILLON SAID MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE B, C, D, AND F. REGARDING CESSATION OF "MASSIVE" DELIVERIES, ROUILLON ADMITTED THIS POSITION WOULD PERMIT CONTINUATION OF FRENCH DELIVERIES IN WHICH GOF IS GREATLY INTERESTED. HE THUS INDICATED GOF NOT SUGGESTING TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO FOR ME. "LOGIC" OF ITS POSITION IS THAT "MASSIVE" DELIVERIES IN THEMSELVES PRODUCE INSTABILITY, WHEREAS SMALL AMOUNTS DO NOT.

3. ROUILLON INDICATED NO FRENCH FLEXIBILITY ON PRINCIPLE THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MUST BE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. ALLOWING HOWEVER FOR "MINOR RECTIFICATIONS" OF BORDERS, ROUILLON ADMITTED GOF HAD PREVIOUSLY MAINTAINED THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL NEED NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY ARAB RE-OCCUPATION OF THOSE TERRITORIES, SINCE WITHDRAWING ISRAELI FORCES COULD BE REPLACED WITH NEUTRAL FORCES AND DEMILITARIZED ZONES ESTABLISHED. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT CURRENT GOF POLICY WAS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

4. ROUILLON SAID FRENCH INSISTENCE ON SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE "UNDER AEGIS OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL" IS FLEXIBLE FORMULA. NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE WITHIN SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF, FOR INSTANCE MEETING AS A COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PARTIES. OR, IT COULD SIMPLY MEAN THAT UNSC WOULD BE INFORMED PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGAIN AT THEIR CONCLUSION; THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE TO GOF. ROUILLON INDICATED FRANCE BELIEVED SC SHOULD APPROVE OF NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE BEFORE IT BEGINS, BE INFORMED PERIODICALLY DURING PROCESS, AND HAVE THE RESULTS SUBMITTED TO IT FOR APPROPRIATE ENDORSEMENT AT THE END. THIS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 PARIS 27643 241914Z

FINAL ACT OF UNSC UNDERWRITING THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE PART OF THE "INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE" WHICH GOF CONSIDERS ESSENTIAL UNDER OPERATIVE PARA 1B OF UNSC 242.

5. COMMENT: ROLE OF "GREAT POWERS" IN THE SETTLEMENT IS CLEARLY AT THE HEART OF THE FRENCH POSITION CONCERNING A ME SETTLEMENT. FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS WOULD REAFFIRM FRENCH "GRANDEUR", AND HELP OVERCOME THE EMBARRASSMENT OF HAVING BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE SUPER-POWER DIALOGUE WHICH PRODUCED THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. IT WOULD ALSO GIVE FRANCE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN CREDIT AMONG THE ARABS FOR DEFENDING THEIR INTERESTS DURING THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS.
IRWIN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

War

SECRET 162

3

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08578 250100Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHCOSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 267
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8578

EXDIS

Keating / Allon

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON

REF: BEIRUT 12333

1. PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH MRS MEIR TODAY, I HAD ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON IN CABINET ROOM ADJOINING PM'S OFFICE.

2. ALLON DESCRIBED SITUATION IN SOUTH ALONG LINES ALREADY REPORTED WITH EMPHASIS ON FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT TAKEN INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE CEASEFIRE. HE REITERATED GOI POSITION THAT EGYPTIANS INITIATED MASSIVE VIOLATION OF CEASEFIRE TODAY IN ORDER MAKE SUPREME - AND HOPEFULLY LAST - EFFORT BREAK IDF SEIGE OF THIRD ARMY. HE NOTED HOW TEMPTING IT WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO GIVE IDF THE 3-5 MORE DAYS REQUIRED ALONG SUEZ FRONT TO WIN A MILITARY VICTORY OVER EGYPT OF TRULY ASTOUNDING PROPORTIONS - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE EGYPTIAN ARMY. WHEN ONE RECALLS WHAT THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS IN SOUTH WHEN FIGHTING BEGAN, SUCH A

MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT WOULD BE EVEN MORE REMARKABLE. DESPITE THE TEMPTATION, HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE GOI MEANT IT WHEN IT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 08578 250100Z

TOLK THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE.
ISRAEL HAS NOT AND WILL NOT, THEREFORE, TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO
VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT OR ANYWHERE ELSE.

3. REFERRING TO THE TEMPTATION IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS TO FINISH OFF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY, ALLON SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THIS PROBABLY WAS THE WRONG THING TO DO FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ANY HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE NOTED IT WAS PROBABLY A GOOD THING EGYPTIANS COULD STILL CLAIM SOME SEMBLANCE OF VICTORY IN HAVING CROSSED THE CANAL AND, AT LEAST IN SOME PLACES, STAYED THERE AND ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR EGYPTIAN PRIDE AND HONOR.]*

4. ALLON THEN TURNED TO THE NORTHERN FRONT POINTING OUT IT WAS TOTALLY QUIET, "NOT A SINGLE SHOT." HE NOTED THIS SHOULD BE CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL ONLY SHOOTS BACK WHEN SOMEONE ELSE VIOLATES THE CEASEFIRE AND SHOOTS FIRST.

5. ALLON DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE CAPTURE OF MT. HERMON, NOTING THAT BY CAPTURING THE LAST SYRIAN HELD POST ISRAEL HAD TOTAL CONTROL OF THIS MOST STRATEGIC POSITION. IN THIS RESPECT HE ALSO NOTED THE CAPTURED SYRIAN POSITION IS ASTRIDE THE "ARAFAT TRAIL," A FAVORITE INFILTRATION ROUTE OF THE FEDAYEEN FROM LEBANON TO ISRAEL.

6. ALLON THEN EXPANDED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE FEDAYEEN BY STATING "AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE TAKING CARE OF YOUR FRIENDS AS WELL," MAKING CLEAR HE WAS REFERRING TO GOI DECISION TO ABSTAIN FROM ATTACKS ON JORDAN OR RETALIATION AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT ON BEHALF OF MRS. MEIR HE WAS RECEIVING THE DELEGATIONS OF CIVILIANS FROM THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTH THAT ARE UNDER ATTACK BY THE FEDAYEEN. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE GOI TO TELL THESE PEOPLE WHY THE IDF IS NOT PROTECTING THEM, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT EVEN SYRIA HAS ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GOI ACTIONS AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO DATE HAVE BEEN CONFINED TO AMBUSHES AND OTHER ACTIONS TOTALLY ON ISRAELI SOIL. ISRAEL, HE NOTED, UNDERSTOOD THE DILEMMA. LEBANON CLAIMS IT IS TOO WEAK TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN; ISRAEL COULD VERY EASILY CONTROL THEM BY SENDING A NUMBER OF SMALL UNITS INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS, OF

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 08578 250100Z

COURSE, WOULD CREATE ANOTHER POLITICAL CRISIS WHICH ISRAEL SINCERELY WISHES TO AVOID. HE STRESSED THAT HE HOPED THE LEBANESE HAD BY NOW LEARNED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MRS. MEIR'S WORDS AND BY THIS HE MEANT THE REFERENCE TO THE FEDAYEEN IN HER REMARKS TO THE KNESSET YESTERDAY. THIS, HE STRESSED, WAS A CLEAR WARNING THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO ACT OR THE GOI WOULD BE FORCED TO BY DOMESTIC PRESSURES.

7. I TOOK THIS OCCASION TO SUMMARIZE THE MANY EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE WITH THE GOL, STRESSING AMBASSADOR BUFFUM'S LATEST HIGH LEVEL CONVERSATIONS IN BEIRUT, DRAWING LIBERALLY ON BEIRUT'S 12333. ALLON WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE INFORMATION THAT PRESIDENT FRANGI HAD CONVOKED THE LEBANESE MILITARY WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS AND HE SAID "I HOPE THIS WILL PRODUCE THE REQUIRED RESULT." I TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE NOT, OF COURSE, IN A POSITION TO GUARANTEE ANYTHING BUT IT SEEMED CLEAR LEBANESE WERE TRYING AND UNDERSTOOD THE CEASEFIRE WAS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT IN SITUATION. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE SURE GOL UNDERSTOOD SIGNIFICANCE OF MRS. MEIR'S COMMENTS BEFORE KNESSET.

8. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM IS PERFECTLY FREE TO DRAW ON RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THIS TELEGRAM IN CONVERSATIONS WITH GOL ON PROBLEM OF NECESSITY CONTROL FEDAYEEN.
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TELEGRAM
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24 Oct

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03233 241336Z

53
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CCO-00
USSS-00 IO-14 AF-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10
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ACDA-19 OMB-01 DRC-01 /120 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4108
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 3233

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN REACTION TO CEASEFIRE

SUMMARY: SADAT'S DECISION TO ACCEPT CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE
UNPOPULAR IN EGYPT. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL REACTION IN EGYPT TO CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE
NEGATIVE. AT STREET LEVEL, MANY EGYPTIANS APPEAR TO BE
CONSUMED WITH DOUBT AND SUSPICION AS TO REASONS FOR CEASEFIRE
AS LONG AS MILITARY SITUATION APPEARS TO BE GOOD. MANY BELIEVE
THAT, WHATEVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ISRAEL WILL NOT HONOR CEASE-
FIRE, AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY SADAT ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE
RESOLUTION WHICH APPEARS TO BE TO EGYPT'S DISADVANTAGE.
2. WE HAVE REPORTED DE BORCHGRAVE'S REACTION OF ARMY IN
ONE SECTOR OF FRONT. THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CASE ELSEWHERE,
BUT CANNOT EXCLUDE IT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SUGGESTION THAT OTHER
SECTORS OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY ARE NOT PLEASED BY CEASEFIRE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 03233 241336Z

3. EDUCATED EGYPTIANS ARE ALSO REPORTED (BY OTHER EMBASSIES AND JOURNALISTS) TO BE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT CEASEFIRE. SOME SAY THAT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AT THIS POINT WOULD TOTALLY NEGATE PURPOSE OF WAR, SINCE THERE IS NO CONCRETE LINKAGE BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND FINAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD RETURN TO EGYPT ITS LANDS LOST IN 1967. IN GENERAL, THESE EGYPTIANS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE AWARE OF EXTENT OF ISRAELI INCURSION INTO WEST BANK OF CANAL, AND THEREFORE BASE THEIR DISSATISFACTION ON AN ASSUMPTION OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY VICTORY. THIS VIEW WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CHANGE AS AND WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD THE TRUTH OF THE SITUATION (MOST RECENT GOE COMMUNIQUE NOTES DETERIORATION OF MILITARY SITUATION, BUT BLAMES IT ON MASSIVE ISRAELI CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS DURING NIGHT OF OCTOBER 22/23), BUT WE DO NOT ESTIMATE THAT THEIR AFFECTION FOR SADAT AND GOE WILL INCREASE.

4. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHERE THIS WILL LEAD. IT SEEMS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SADAT IS FACED WITH POTENTIALLY UNSTABLE SITUATION WHICH MAY BE TRANSLATED INTO REAL PRESSURES BOTH ON CEASEFIRE AND ON HIS POSITION.
SMITH

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BY JONATHAN SHARP

PEKING, OCT. 24 REUTER -- THE CHINESE PRESS TODAY ISSUED ITS FIRST DIRECT COMMENT ON THE U.S.-SOVIET RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ACCUSING THE TWO SUPERPOWERS OF TRYING TO "PUT OUT THE BLAZING FIRE OF THIS JUST WAR."

A COMMENTARY BY THE OFFICIAL NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY CHINA'S U.N. REPRESENTATIVES WHO DECLINED TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"... IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THEIR SCRAMBLE FOR HEGEMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE TWO SUPER-POWERS ARE NAKEDLY PURSUING BIG POWER POLITICS AND IMPOSING A NEW NO WAR, NO PEACE SITUATION ON THE PEOPLE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES," THE AGENCY SAID.

THE CHINESE VIEW -- AS HAS BEEN EXPRESSED PRIVATELY TO ARAB DIPLOMATS IN PEKING SINCE THE WAR BEGAN -- IS THAT THE ARABS ARE BEING SYSTEMATICALLY BEATRYED BY THEIR SOVIET ALLIES WHO ARE NOT, THE CHINESE ALLEGE, PREPARED TO GIVE THE ARAB NATIONS THE SUPPORT THEY NEED TO ACHIEVE EVEN PART OF THEIR AIMS.

WHILE CHINA WOULD EMPHATICALLY DENY THAT IT WANTS WAR FOR ITS OWN SAKE, CHINESE LEADERS CLEARLY DOUBT THAT THERE IS ANY PROSPECT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHILE ISRAEL IS IN POSSESSION OF SUCH LARGE TRACTS OF ARAB TERRITORY.

THE CALLS BY THE SUPERPOWERS FOR AN IN-PLACE CEASEFIRE ARE SEEN BY PEKING AS AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE STALEMATE FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH ENDS.

THE CHINESE PRESS HAS GIVEN EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, PUBLISHING AT LENGTH ARAB MILITARY COMMUNIQUEs AND STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT BY FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

BUT YESTERDAY, THE DAY AFTER THE FIRST U.S.-SOVIET RESOLUTION WAS ACCEPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE AMOUNT OF SPACE DEVOTED TO THE MIDDLE EAST DROPPED SHARPLY.

CHINA HAS DEPICTED THE WAR FROM THE START AS AN OVERT ACT OF AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL, AND HAS ISSUED SEVERAL STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING MESSAGES SENT BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI TO THE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN LEADERS.

OBSERVERS SAID TODAY THAT CHINESE DISAPPROVAL OF THE WASHINGTON-MOSCOW INITIATIVES IS BOUND TO CAST A SHADOW OVER THE FORTHCOMING PEKING VISIT BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, WHICH WAS DUE TO START THIS WEEK BUT HAS NOT BEEN POSTPONED.

THE POSTPONEMENT HAD BEEN WIDELY ANTICIPATED HERE SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR.

REUTER PK/JK0242

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.... MIDEAST - TROOPS :

WASHINGTON, OCT 24, REUTER - THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION OF SENDING TROOPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND HOPES THAT NO OTHER OUTSIDE POWER WILL SEND TROOPS, THE WHITE HOUSE SAID TODAY.

PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN GERALD WARREN MADE CLEAR THE U.S. POSITION WHEN ASKED ABOUT A REPORT BY THE MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY THAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT HAD REQUESTED THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO SEND FORCES TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

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War
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PAGE 01 STATE 210336

14
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 SS-20 NSC-10 CPR-02 PA-04 RSC-01

USIA-15 PRS-01 EUR-25 IO-14 /121 R

DRAFTED BY AF/NIJVMONTVILLE:MHD
APPROVED BY AF/DDNEWSOM
NEA:ALATHERTON
AF/NIJJBLAKE
S/S: MR. GAMMON
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS

***** 070736

R 242344Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 210336

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR XF MR US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO OULD DADDAH TELEGRAM

REF: 1 NOUAKCHOTT 988 AND 993

1. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRESIDENT TO OULD DADDAH IN LETTER FORMAT: "I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM REGARDING THE TRAGIC HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT AT NO TIME HAVE AMERICAN TROOPS BEEN COMMITTED TO BATTLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MOREOVER, THE UNITED STATES HAS WORKED ENERGETICALLY TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND LAY THE BASIS FOR FUTURE PEACEMAKING EFFORTS. TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET UNION WE INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 22 DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THIS TROUBLED AREA.

2. RECALLING OUR MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER, 1971,

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AND THE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH TOOK PLACE, I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A FINAL SETTLEMENT TO THIS CONFLICT WHICH WILL PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON." WE DO NOT PLAN TO PUBLICIZE RESPONSE BUT WOULD NOT OBJECT SHOULD GIRM WISH TO DO SO. KISSINGER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #60

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT 10/24/73

Ceasefire

The ceasefire which went into effect at 0700 battle-field time today (0100 EDT) apparently was violated on the Egyptian front at about 1400 local (0800 EDT) when the Israelis say the Egyptian 3rd army began an attempt to break out of its position east of the Canal toward the Mitla Pass. The IDF spokesman said the Israeli forces are "acting accordingly" and claimed that 15 Egyptian planes had been downed in the action. The IDF termed the Egyptian air activity "massive," and indicated that Egyptian 3rd army units west of the Canal, near Suez City, also were in action. The GOI believes that use of coordinated air attacks indicates that this action was taken by Egyptian leaders senior to the 3rd army commander.

The Syrian front reportedly was quiet through the day. The IDF is reported to have begun "heavy artillery fire" against fedayeen areas in southern Lebanon. A UNTSO source in Lebanon reported that the Lebanese army seemed to be making no effort to suppress fedayeen activity against Israel. There are press reports that "thousands of students" demonstrated in Beirut today against the ceasefire.

Mrs. Meir on the Ceasefire

Embassy Tel Aviv reports that in her speech yesterday to the Knesset (Sitrep No. 58), Mrs. Meir deviated from the prepared, and released, text to insert two statements. First, she said that the reference to negotiations in UNSC resolution 338 means direct negotiations and she insisted that this "is the official interpretation from the highest U.S. sources." The second insertion was her statement that "it was made clear to all (by GOI in August 1970) that our firm stand is still maintained regarding the right of uniting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel." Mrs. Meir undoubtedly was reacting to the right wing criticism of her government's acceptance of the ceasefire.

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GDS--DECLAS. Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

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Oil Developments

Saudi Oil Minister Yamani has told the Japanese that they can escape a 14-15% cut in Saudi oil shipments to Japan only by cutting diplomatic or economic relations with Israel, selling arms to Arab states, or by lobbying intensively with the U.S. on behalf of a settlement of the Mideast conflict "in accordance with the UN resolutions." The Japanese Embassy in Jidda believes that none of these proposals is acceptable but that a high-level Japanese representative may go to Riyadh to talk with King Faisal.

Embassy Jidda points out that despite the nearly 25% cutback in Saudi oil exports, recently decreed rises in Gulf oil posted prices mean that the Saudis will actually increase net current income by \$4-5 million per day. Price levels could rise still further if additional production cutbacks were ordered. American oil company officials report that only by follow-through and implementation of Resolution 242 will the Saudis be persuaded to lift their production cutbacks and export embargo; if these measures do not succeed in producing results, the Saudis may go further, including the nationalization of American oil interests in the Kingdom.

Kuwait and Qatar have followed the example of Algeria and Iraq in embargoing oil shipments to the Netherlands -- estimated at 11% of total Kuwait production. Meanwhile, the Kuwait oil workers' three-day strike against the Anglo-American Kuwait Oil Company and the American Independent Oil Company is in its second day with all refining operations at a standstill.

United Arab Emirate President Shaikh Zayid has warned that in addition to the oil export embargo the UAE may take further steps against U.S. economic interest. The Embassy fears that Zayid, who is relatively unsophisticated in dealing with the Arab press, may be highly vulnerable to pressures generated by events and by his non-UAE Arab advisors to implement further measures against U.S. economic interests.

APPROVED BY: _____

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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War
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PAGE 01 USUN N 04156 240336Z

71
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 NEA-10 RSC-01
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
PA-04 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 SSO-00 CCO-00
NSCE-00 INRE-00 DRC-01 /169 W

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

UNSC - 10/23

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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF
SUBJ: SC RESOLUTION CONFIRMING ME CEASEFIRE

Stormy

SUMMARY. SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ONE OF STORMIEST SESSIONS SINCE COLD WAR, AS CHINA AND USSR TRADED INSULTS DURING DEBATE ON RESOLUTION CONFIRMING MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE. BURDEN OF CHINA'S COMPLAINT WAS THAT SUPER-POWER CONSPLICATORS OF RES HAD RUSHED IT THROUGH WITHOUT GIVING SC MEMBERS CHANCE FOR HOLDING CONSULTATIONS OR OBTAINING INSTRUCTIONS, AND WERE USING COUNCIL AS RUBBER STAMP FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. WHILE SOME NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS DEPLORED LACK OF TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS, THERE WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF NEED FOR PROMPT ACTION. EGYPT AND ISRAEL BLAMED EACH OTHER FOR VIOLATING CEASEFIRE, BUT NEITHER THEY NOR MOST SC MEMBERS OPPOSED

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SUBSTANCE OF RES. UNSYG SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY DISPATCH UN OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE CEASEFIRE, BUT CAUTIONED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY NEED MORE MEN TO DO JOB PROPERLY. END SUMMARY.

1. ISRAELI AMB TEKOAH SPOKE FIRST AFTER EGYPTIAN FONMIN ZAYYAT, WHO HAD CALLED MEETING, ASKED TO DEFER HIS STATEMENT UNTIL AFTER VOTE. TEKOAH ACCUSED EGYPT OF CONTINUING ATTACKS IN VIOLATION OF CEASEFIRE. HE ITEMIZED CEASEFIRE BREACHES, CLAIMING EGYPTIAN ARTILLERY AND BAZOOKA FIRE WAS CONTINUING EVEN NOW IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ. ISRAELI FORCES HAD BEEN ORDER TO RETURN FIRE. ISRAEL, HOWEVER, WAS STILL PREPARED TO STOP FIGHTING AS SOON AS EGYPT DID. FOR ISRAEL, "INDISPENSABLE CONDITION" OF ANY CEASEFIRE WAS RETURN OF ALL POW'S.

2. US INTRODUCED DRAFT RES, RESERVING RIGHT TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE AFTER VOTE. (AMB SCALIA'S STATEMENT TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.)

3. USSR'S AMB MALIK, AFTER BRIEF EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, PROPOSED DRAFT RES BE IMMEDIATELY PUT TO VOTE. AT THIS POINT CHINESE DEP FONMIN CHIAO INTERVENED TO SAY CHINA WOULD NOT ALLOW SUPER POWERS TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON COUNCIL WITHOUT PERMITTING DEBATE ON RES WHICH HAD NOT EVEN BEEN TRANSLATED IN ALL LANGUAGES. CHIAO, SAID UN WAS NOT A TOOL TO BE MANIPULATED BY US AND USSR, TO BE JUGGLED IN UTTER DISREGARD OF OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS. AFTER INCREASINGLY HEATED EXCHANGES BETWEEN CHINESE AND SOVIET DEPS, SC PRES MCINTYRE ADJOURNED SESSION FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES TO PERMIT TEMPERS TO COOL. WHEN COUNCIL RESUMED, USSR DID NOT PRESS ITS REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE VOTE AND CHINA COMPLETED ITS COMMENTS ON SUBSTANCE OF RES. ESSENTIALLY THESE WERE THAT RES WAS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AND DEMAND RETURN TO JUNE 1967 BOUNDARIES. IT WAS, MOREOVER, EVEN MORE AMBIGUOUS THAN SC RES 242 AND WAS IN SHORT A FRAUD THAT WOULD SOLVE NO PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE OPPOSED TO IT, CHINA WOULD NOT VETO IT OUT OF RESPECT FOR PARTIES CONCERNED.

4. FOLLOWING VOTE, UK SAID IT SUPPORTED RES BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR FURTHER ACTION WAS URGENTLY REQUIRED. IT WELCOMED DISPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE CEASEFIRE AND

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BELIEVED NUMBER OF OBSERVERS MIGHT WELL HAVE TO BE INCREASED.
UK SAW NO OBJECTION TO SYG TAKING ACTION TO THIS END,
AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ADVICE OF UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF.

5. AT THIS STAGE SOVIET AMB MALIK MADE ANOTHER RAMBLING
STATE, LARGELY IN RESPONSE TO CHINESE. ONE SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT
WAS WARNING TO ISRAEL BY SOVIET GOVT OF "SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
INVOLVED IN CONTINUATION OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST
EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVTS."

6. FRENCH DEL ALSO SAID IT BELIEVED RES RESPONDED TO
IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF SITUATION. SYG MUST BE AUTHORIZED TO
SET UP URGENTLY THE NEEDED MECHANISM AND PROBABLY WOULD NEED
TO BE AUTHORIZED TO SEND ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS.

7. SYG SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF
TO HOLD OBSERVERS IN READINESS FOR TYPE OF OPERATION
CONTEMPLATED IN RES'S PARA TWO. HE REQUESTED COOPERATION
OF PARTIES AND SAID HE EXPECTED HE WOULD HAVE TO INCREASE
NUMBER OF OBSERVERS. AT CLOSE OF MEETING, SYG ANNOUNCED
THAT UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF HAD ALREADY REPORTED THAT AS FIRST
STEP THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, ISMAILIA, IN COOPERATION WITH
EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES, WOULD DEPLOY IMMEDIATELY THREE OBSERVER
TEAMS, ONE IN NORTHERN SECTOR, ONE IN CENTRAL SECTOR, AND
ONE IN SOUTHERN SECTOR. ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAD
BEEN INFORMED AND CHIEF OF STAFF WAS DISCUSSING WITH THEM
SIMILAR OPERATIONS BASED ON KANTARA FOR THE EASTERN SIDE
OF THE CANAL.

8. EGYPTIAN FONMIN ZAYYAT SAID EGYPTIAN TARGETS REMAINED
SIMPLE: LIBERATION OF ARAB TERRITORY AND RESTORATION OF
RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. ZAYYAT CONTINUED THAT END
TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION WAS SINE QUA NON OF PEACE AND
EGYPT EXPECTED SUPER POWERS TO ENSURE ISRAELI RETURN OF
ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY. EGYPT ALSO EXPECTED THAT PARA ONE
OF SC RES JUST ADOPTED WOULD BE CARRIED OUT TO LETTER, THAT
IS, ALL FORCES WOULD BE RETURNED TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED AT
MOMENT CEASEFIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE.
SCALT

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 671

PAGE 01 JIDDA 04688 241149Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O R 241115Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5289
INFO USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 4688

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, JA, XF
SUBJ: YAMANI INFORMS JAPANESE OF 14-15 PERCENT CUT UNLESS
ACTION TAKEN

REF: JIDDA 4582

SUMMARY: JAPANESE AMBASSADOR HAS APPROACHED MINPET YAMANI
WHO CONFIRMED JAPAN NOT ON LIST OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHO WILL
BE FAVORED BY SAUDIS IN SELECTIVE OIL EMBARGO/CUTBACK. YAMANI
INDICATED JAPAN MIGHT ESCAPE 14-15 PERCENT CUT IN SHIPMENTS
ONLY IF TOKYO TAKES ONE OF SEVERAL ACTIONS: CUTTING RELATIONS
WITH ISRAEL, WITHDRAWING JAPANESE INDUSTRIES ACTIVE IN THAT
COUNTRY, SELLING SOME WEAPONS TO ANY OF THE ARAB STATES, OR
BECOMING DIPLOMATICALLY ACTIVE IN LOBBYING WITH U.S. ON BE-
HALF OF WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND

ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELD
V. I. G.
WALSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 JIDDA 04688 241149Z

PEACE SETTLEMENT. JAPANESE FEEL NONE OF ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN BY TOKYO, BUT HIGH-LEVEL REP MIGHT BE SENT TO DISSUADE FAISAL FROM PARTIAL EMBARGO. END SUMMARY.

1. JAPANESE HAVE INFORMED US OF OCTOBER 23 CALL BY AMBASSADOR ON MINPET YAMANI, FIRST SINCE WAR BEGAN, WHICH COVERED SUBJECT OF WHAT 10-PERCENT CUT MIGHT MEAN TO JAPANESE OIL IMPORTS FROM KINGDOM. YAMANI REVEALED THAT SOME COUNTRIES WERE BEING PREFERRED IN THIS CUTBACK, INCLUDING ARAB STATES, SOME ISLAMIC STATES, SIMIN, FRANCE ATQHECFPS UNITED KINGDOM. JAPAN HAD NOT MADE LIST AND THIS MEANT THAT SHE WOULD HAVE TO SHARE REMAINING LEVEL OF OIL EXPORTS AFTER OLD LEVELS OF EXPORT TO FAVORED NATIONS MET. THIS WOULD MEAN AN ESTIMATED 14-15 PERCENT REDUCTON IN SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN, WHICH EMBASSY ADMITTED MUST SHOCK TOKYO.

2. YAMANI SAID THAT JAPAN COULD AVOID THIS IF SHE WOULD TAKE SOME FRIENDLY STEPS TOWARDS ARABS, SUCH AS CUTTING OFF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL UNTIL IT WITHDREW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, ENDING SHIPMENTS OF IMPORTANT ITEMS TO ISRAEL AND INVOLVEMENT OF SOME KEY JAPANESE INDUSTRIES IN THAT COUNTRY, OR PERHAPS SHIPMENT OF SOME WAR MUNITIONS TO ARAB STATES. HE MENTIONED LAST WITH SMILE SINCE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS MADE IT CLEAR THAT JAPAN COULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHIP ANY MUNITIONS TO WARRING COUNTRIES.

3. YAMANI ALSO DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY OF JAPANESE UNDERTAKING QUOTE KISSINGER-LIKE ACTIVITY WITH U.S. UNQUOTE ON SUBJECT OF SETTLING ME CONFLICTG WITH WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. ONLY IF JAPAN WERE TO SHOW INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WITH U.S. COULD THIS METHOD OF AVOIDING CUTBACKS SUCCEED. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION, YAMANI SHOWED CALM SELF-CONFIDENCE.

4. JAPANESE EMBASSY SOURCE IS OF OPINION THAT NONE O THESE PROPOSALS ARE WITHIN REALM OF POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AND INDICATED THAT TOKYO TO BE ASKED TO SEND HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE TO TALK WITH KING FAISAL.
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DTA748
DE RUEHDT #4164 2972034
O R 242000Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 455

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3660
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4483
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4267
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 2099
USINT CAIRO 3522
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8177
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9273
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4650

UNCLAS USUN 4164

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFUR, UN, XF
SUBJ: SYG ON SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF SC RES 338

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG'S STATEMENT TO SC
OCTOBER 23 RE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASE-FIRE:
A. "I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM THE DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SYRIA,
WHO HAS ASKED ME TO INFORM THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE OF ITS CONTENTS. THIS COMMUNICATION REFERS
TO THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED
YESTERDAY. IT READS AS FOLLOWS:

"WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR CABLE DATED 22 OCTOBER 1973
TRANSMITTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)
ADOPTED ON 22 OCTOBER 1973 AT THE 1747TH MEETING, I
SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD NOTE AND INFORM THE
SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS
ACCEPTED THAT RESOLUTION AND STATES THAT IT HAS UNDERSTOOD
THE RESOLUTION TO BE BASED ON:

- "1. THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM
ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH WERE OCCUPIED IN JUNE
1967 AND SUBSEQUENTLY;
- "2. THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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acceptance

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"THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION IS
CONDITIONAL UPON THE OTHER PARTY'S UNDERTAKING TO IMPLEMENT
THE RESOLUTION. (SIGNED) ABDUL HALIM KHADDAM, DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS."
SCHAUFLE
BT

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PAGE 02

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ROUTINE
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DE RUESKG #5675 2971435
R 241343Z PLW73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9833

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 7392
USINT CAIRO 2535
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2418
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4785
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0440
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5573
USMISSION USUN NY 2653

S E C R E T AMMAN 5675

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, SY, XF
SUBJ: SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION
GREEK AMB TO JORDAN, RESIDENT DAMASCUS, GAVE EMBDFF
OCTOBER 24 FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN SYRIA:

1. SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE CEASE-FIRE DELAYED BY ASAD'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. ESSENTIALLY ONLY ASAD AND HIGHER COMMAND SYRIAN ARMY DESIRE CEASE-FIRE. FEDAYEEN AND IRAQIS ARE MANEUVERING TO PREVENT SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE CEASE-FIRE AND PROBABLY TO ACHIEVE OVERTHROW. IRAQIS ABLE BACK UP THEIR POSITION BY PRESENCE NUMEROUS IRAQI TROOPS (TWO DIVISIONS PLUS) WITH MORE ENROUTE. IRAQIS ALSO ATTEMPTING SUBVERT SYRIAN COMPANY AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS WHO DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE ISRAELIS ARE WINNING. (SEE AMMAN 5665 FOR DETAILS MIL SITUATION.)

2. SITUATION IN AMBASSADOR'S VIEW STILL DICEY. FEDAYEEN HAVE ALIGNED THEMSELVES WITH IRAQIS FOR SELF-PRESERVATION. EVEN IF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SPONSORED BY SUPER-POWERS NOT IN OFFING, FEDAYEEN ARE FINISHED. THEY NOT ONLY FAILED TAKE ANY PRESSURE OFF SYRIAN ARMY BUT THEIR ANTICS GUT THEM IN SYRIANS' WAY. IF ASAD SURVIVES TSAQUSSIS BELIEVES FEDAYEEN WILL BE SUPPRESSED BY SYRIANS.

3. HOWEVER, PRESENCE MASSIVE IRAQI FORCES IN SYRCA VERY

***** *WHSR COMMENT*****

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DANGEROUS FOR ASAD AND EVEN WORSE FOR PEACE EFFORTS. ASAD'S SURVIVAL PREDICATED EITHER ON QUICK POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN UN OR BY SUPER-POWERS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY HIS ACCEPTANCE CEASE-FIRE. OTHERWISE HE IN TROUBLE WITH RADICALS. AMB BELIEVES THAT ONLY OTHER SOLUTION FOR ASAD'S TROUBLES WOULD BE MOVEMENT OF JORDANIAN ARMY INTO SYRIA BOTH AS MIL AND POLITICAL COUNTER-BALANCE AGAINST IRAQIS.

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 6471
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 5024
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3611
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 3917

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8578

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US, XF

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON

REF: BEIRUT 12333

1. PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH MRS MEIR TODAY, I HAD ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON IN CABINET ROOM ADJOINING PM'S OFFICE.

2. ALLON DESCRIBED SITUATION IN SOUTH ALONG LINES ALREADY REPORTED WITH EMPHASIS ON FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT TAKEN INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE CEASEFIRE. HE REITERATED GOI POSITION THAT EGYPTIANS INIT-538 .-8:3 ;89)-589, 9! :3-3!843 598-6 8, 94834 .-(3 7043.3 --AND HOPEFULLY LAST - EFFORT BREAK IDF SEIGE OF THIRD ARMY. HE NOTED HOW TEMPTING IT WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO GIVE IDF THE 3-5 MORE DAYS REQUIRED ALONG SUEZ FRONT TO WIN A MILITARY VICTORY OVER EGYPT OF TRULY ASTOUNDING PROPORTIONS - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE EGYPTIAN ARMY. WHEN ONE RECALLS WHAT THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS IN SOUTH WHEN FIGHTING BEGAN, SUCH A MILITARY ACHIEVEMENT WOULD BE EVEN MORE REMARKABLE. DESPITE THE TEMPTATION, HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE GOI MEANT IT WHEN IT TOLD THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE. ISRAEL HAS NOT AND WILL NOT, THEREFORE, TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT OR ANYWHERE ELSE.

3. REFERRING TO THE TEMPTATION IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS TO FINISH OFF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY, ALLON SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THIS PROBABLY WAS THE WRONG THING TO DO FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ANY HOPE FOR PEACE

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IN THE AREA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE NOTED IT WAS PROBABLY A GOOD THING EGYPTIANS COULD STILL CLAIM SOME SENSE OF VICTORY IN HAVING CROSSED THE CANAL AND, AT LEAST IN SOME PLACES, STAYED THERE AND ALL THIS IMPLIED FOR EGYPTIAN PRIDE AND HONOR.

4. ALLON THEN TURNED TO THE NORTHERN FRONT POINTING OUT IT WAS TOTALLY QUIET, "NOT A SINGLE SHOT." HE NOTED THIS SHOULD BE CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL ONLY SHOOTS BACK WHEN SOMEONE ELSE VIOLATES THE CEASEFIRE AND SHOOTS FIRST.

5. ALLON DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE CAPTURE OF MT. HERMON, NOTING THAT BY CAPTURING THE LAST SYRIAN HELD POST ISRAEL HAD TOTAL CONTROL OF THIS MOST STRATEGIC POSITION. IN THIS RESPECT HE ALSO NOTED THE CAPTURED SYRIAN POSITION IS ASTRIDE THE "ARAFAT TRAIL," A FAVORITE INFILTRATION ROUTE OF THE FEDAYEEN FROM LEBANON TO ISRAEL.

6. ALLON THEN EXPANDED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE FEDAYEEN BY STATING "AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE TAKING CARE OF YOUR FRIENDS AS WELL," MAKING CLEAR HE WAS REFERRING TO GDI DECISIONS TO ABSTAIN FROM ATTACKS ON JORDAN OR RETALIATION AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT ON BEHALF OF MRS. MEIR HE WAS RECEIVING THE DELEGATIONS OF CIVILIANS FROM THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE NORTH THAT ARE UNDER ATTACK BY THE FEDAYEEN. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE GDI TO TELL THESE PEOPLE WHY THE IDF IS NOT PROTECTING THEM, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT EVEN SYRIA HAS ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GDI ACTIONS AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO DATE HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO AMBUSHES AND OTHER ACTIONS TOTALLY ON ISRAELI SOIL. ISRAEL, HE NOTED, UNDERSTOOD THE DILEMMA. LEBANON CLAIMS IT IS TOO WEAK TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN; ISRAEL COULD VERY EASILY CONTROL THEM BY SENDING A NUMBER OF SMALL UNITS INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD CREATE ANOTHER POLITICAL CRISIS WHICH ISRAEL SINCE WISHES TO AVOID. HE STRESSED THAT HE HOPED THE LEBANESE HAD BY NOW LEARNED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MRS. MEIR'S WORDS AND BY THIS HE MEANT THE REFERENCE TO THE FEDAYEEN IN HER REMARKS TO THE KNESSET YESTERDAY. THIS, HE STRESSED, WAS A CLEAR WARNING THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO ACT OR THE GDI WOULD BE FORCED TO BY DOMESTIC PRESSURES.

7. I TOOK THIS OCCASION TO SUMMARIZE THE MANY EFFORTS WE HAVE MADE WITH THE GDI, STRESSING AMBASSADOR RUFFUM'S LATEST HIGH LEVEL CONVERSATIONS IN BEIRUT, DRAWING LIBERALLY ON BEIRUT'S 12333. ALLON WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE INFORMATION THAT PRESIDENT FRANGI HAD CONVOKED THE LEBANESE MILITARY WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS AND HE SAID "I HOPE THIS WILL PRODUCE THE REQUIRED RESULT." I TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE NOT, OF COURSE, IN A POSITION TO GUARANTEE

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PAGE 02

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ANYTHING BUT IT SHOULD CLEAR LEBANESE WERE TRYING AND UNDERSTOOD
THE CEASEFIRE AS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT IN SITUATION.
WE WOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE SURE GOL UNDERSTOOD SIGNIFICANCE OF
MRS. MEIR'S COMMENTS BEFORE KNESSET.

R. AMBASSADOR BUFFON IS PERFECTLY FREE TO DRAW ON RELEVANT
PORTIONS OF THIS TELEGRAM IN CONVERSATIONS WITH GOL ON PROBLEM
OF NECESSITY CONTROL FEDAYEEN.

KEATING

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 454

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3668
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4482
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4266
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM 2076
USINT CAIRO 3521
AMEMBASSY LONDON 6176
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9272
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4640

UNCLAS USUN 4163

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF
SUBJ: SYG'S OCTOBER 23 STATEMENTS TO SC ON DEPLOYMENT
UNTSO TEAMS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG'S OCTOBER 23 STATEMENTS
TO SC ON DEPLOYMENT OF UNTSO TEAMS:
A. "YESTERDAY, I PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
IN DOCUMENT S/7939/ADD.2210, A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT
STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION
ORGANIZATION (UNTSO) AS OF 1200 HOURS GMT ON 22 OCTOBER
1973. AS I STATED IN THIS REPORT, PENDING A FURTHER
DIRECTIVE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL I HAVE INSTRUCTED
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO TO HOLD THE UNITED NATIONS
MILITARY OBSERVERS IN READINESS IN THEIR PRESENT
LOCATIONS.

"NOW THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS DECIDED THAT
THE MILITARY OBSERVERS SHOULD BE STATIONED TO
OBSERVE THE SHASE-FIRE CALLED FOR BY THE SECURITY
COUNCIL IN RESOLUTION 338 (1973) OF 22 OCTOBER
1973, I SHALL IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO PUT THE
MILITARY OBSERVERS IN PLACE IN THE SHORTEST
POSSIBLE TIME.

"AS ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ARE AWARE, THE
ACTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MILITARY OBSERVERS REQUIRES

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THE ACTIVE COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND IS BASED UPON THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEASE-FIELD. "I ALSO WISH TO INFORM THE COUNCIL THAT IT WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY BE NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF MILITARY OBSERVERS NOW AVAILABLE IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT EFFECTIVELY THE INTENTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO WILL BE IN IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONCERNED WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF THE OBSERVATION OPERATION. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT I SHALL KEEP THE COUNCIL PROMPTLY INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS."

1. "SINCE I HAVE THE FLOOR I WISH TO INFORM THE COUNCIL OF A REPORT WHICH I HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO, GENERAL SIILASVUO. IT IS AS FOLLOWS.

"AS A FIRST STEP, GENERAL SIILASVUO HAS INSTRUCTED THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE CONTROL CENTRE AT ISMAILIA, IN COOPERATION WITH THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES, TO DEPLOY IMMEDIATELY THREE OBSERVATION TEAMS: ONE IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR, ONE IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR, AND ONE IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OF THE SUEZ CANAL AREA. THE ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THIS AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF IS DISCUSSING WITH THEM A SIMILAR OBSERVATION OPERATION BASED ON THE KANTARA CONTROL CENTRE ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE CANAL."

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4606

INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 457
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3205
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1557
AMEMBASSY DETROIT IMMEDIATE 2266

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JERUSALEM 1195

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XDS-1

TAGS: MOPS, EG, IS, SY, UN

SUBJECT: UNTSO OPERATION ON SUEZ FRONT; POSSIBLE NEW GULAN OPERATION

SUMMARY: UNTSO SOURCE (PROTECT FULLY) REPORTS EGYPTIANS BEGAN
URGING UNTSO SEND IN OBSERVERS DURING AFTERNOON OCTOBER 22.
WHEN INSTRUCTIONS FINALLY CAME MORNING OF FOLLOWING DAY TO
SET UP OBSERVER OPERATION, DAYAN DESIGNATED POINTS FOR STATIC
OPS, ALL BUT ONE LYING ALONG ISRAELI BULGE INTO EGYPT. (OTHER
IS IN NORTH OPPOSITE PORT SAID.) NO OPS PLANNED AS OF NOW
FOR EAST BANK, THOUGH QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED. OBSERVERS
SHOULD BE IN PLACE BY 1500 LOCAL OCTOBER 24. SYRIANS HAVE
ALERTED UNTSO THAT THEY MAY REQUEST OBSERVERS ON GULAN FRONT
AS WELL. END SUMMARY

1. SENIOR UNTSO SOURCE (PROTECT FULLY) GAVE ME FOLLOWING
RUN DOWN ON SETTING UP OBSERVER OPERATION IN SUEZ AREA. KEY
DETAILS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN PRESS, BUT BACKGROUND MAY BE
OF INTEREST.

2. EGYPTIANS BEGAN PRESSING UNTSO TO PUT OBSERVERS ONTO SUEZ
FRONT AS EARLY AS MID-AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23. ACTING FORMIN
FAHMY IMPLORER UNTSO REP IN CAIRO TO THIS EFFECT AND REP'S
CABLE REACHED UNTSO HERE ABOUT 1600 LOCAL. UNTSO HAD CLEAR
IMPRESSION EGYPTIANS DISMAYED BY PROGRESS ISRAELIS WERE MAKING
ON GROUND. FURTHER EGYPTIANS APPEALS RECEIVED DURING
EARLY MORNING LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 24, PRIOR TO THE WORKING
OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAELIS. UNTSO SIMPLY BUCKED REQUESTS
TO NEW YORK, EVEN FOLLOWING SUBSEQUENT WORKING OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS

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WITH BOTH SIDES, EGYPTIANS BEGAN TO INQUIRE WHY UNTSO NOT MOVING MORE QUICKLY. SOURCE HAD UNEASY IMPRESSION THAT EGYPTIANS MIGHT IN SOME WAY ATTEMPT TO FIX ON UNTSO PART OF BLAME FOR WHAT HE SAID WAS CLEARLY MILITARY DEBACLE FOR EGYPTIANS.

3. CMFS SITLASVUU SAW DAYAN AT 0645 LOCAL AFTER EGYPTIANS HAD AGREED TO CEASEFIRE TIMETABLE. DAYAN WAS VERY CORDIAL, APPEARED TO WELCOME UNTSO ROLL. DAYAN NOTED THAT RESOLUTION 249 HAD REFERRED TO UTILIZING OBSERVERS THEN IN CAIRO, AND PROPOSED THAT THEY BE SENT TO SPECIFIC POINTS ALONG PERIMETER OF ISRAELI BULGE INTO WEST BANK (SIX WERE SETTLED UPON). HE SAID ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE AT THOSE POINTS PREPARED TO MEET UNTSO PERSONNEL. POINTS LIE ON LONG ARC WITH NORTHERN OBSERVER POST AT ISMAILIA AND SOUTHERN ONE NEAR GULF OF SUEZ SOUTH OF PORT (PRESUMABLY ADABIYA). POINTS APPEAR TO BE KEY COMMUNICATIONS JUNCTIONS AND OTHER IMPORTANT GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES. A SEVENTH POST WAS AGREED TO ON EAST BANK OPPOSITE PORT SAID.

4. QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING OBSERVER POSTS AROUND EGYPTIAN PERIMETER ON EAST BANK WAS LEFT FOR LATER. DAYAN, SOURCE COMMENTED, SEEMED RELUCTANT TO GET INTO THIS QUESTION. UNTSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING KANTARA CONTROL CENTER ON EAST BANK--UNTSO POST KAHBA--AND SENDING OBSERVERS FROM THERE TO MAN SOME WEST BANK POSTS. ISRAELIS PUT UNTSO OFF BY SAYING CANAL BRIDGES TOO CLOGGED WITH TRAFFIC. UNTSO WAS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELIS WANTED OBSERVERS POSTS AROUND FARTHEST EXTENT OF ISRAELI PENETRATION BUT WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO HAVE THEM ON ANY LINE WITHIN THAT PERIMETER, SUCH AS EGYPTIAN EAST BANK ENCLAVES. UNTSO IS NOW AWAITING ISRAELI RESPONSE TO ITS SPECIFIC REQUEST TO REACTIVATE KAHBA.

5. AS OF NOW, IT IS INTENDED THAT POSTS BE STATIC IN CHARACTER, THOUGH POSSIBILITY OF MOBILE PATROLS IS NOT RULED OUT. SOURCE WAS INCLINED TO BELIEVE MOBILE PATROLS WOULD PRESENT REAL PROBLEM, SINCE DAYAN POINTED OUT THERE WERE ONLY IMAGINARY LINES BETWEEN POINTS WHICH HE INDICATED. WITHIN THESE IMAGINARY LINES WERE OBVIOUSLY POCKETS OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS. IN FACT, GDE HAD URGED UNTSO EARLY OCTOBER 24, ONCE OPERATION AGREED TO, TO SEEK OUT THESE EGYPTIAN FORCES AND SECURE THEIR ESCAPE FROM ENTRAPMENT. UNTSO BUCKED THIS REQUEST TO NEW YORK AS WELL, AND FEELS THE JOB WOULD BE WELL BEYOND ITS CAPABILITY AND MANDATE.

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PAGE 02

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4607

INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 458
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3206
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1558
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2267

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 JERUSALEM 1195

6. EACH POST WILL BE MANNED FOR TIME BEING BY TWO OBSERVERS AND RADIO EQUIPPED JEEP. CENTRAL RADIO CONTROL CENTER BEING SET UP AGAIN IN ISMAILIA TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH POSTS. SOURCE ESTIMATED OBSERVERS BEGAN ARRIVING AT THEIR POSTS BY 1300 LOCAL AND WOULD ALL BE IN PLACE BY ABOUT 1500. EACH POST ACCOMPANIED BY EGYPTIAN LIAISON OFFICER. SOURCE THOUGHT IT LIKELY OBSERVERS WOULD NOT PROCEED THROUGH EGYPTIAN LINES TO MAKE CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS SINCE HE DOUBTED EGYPTIANS WOULD PERMIT THIS. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MIGHT NOT IN ALL CASES BE EGYPTIAN FORCES IN IMMEDIATE CIVITY AND OPS WOULD THEN TOUCH BASE WITH ISRAELIS. DAYAN HAD PROVIDED GUARANTEES FOR SAFETY OF EGYPTIAN OFFICERS INVOLVED.

7. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF OBSERVERS WOULD BE SAME AS HITHERTO: OBSERVE AND REPORT CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. SUCH QUESTIONS AS CONTROLLING FOOD AND WATER SUPPLY MOVEMENTS TO EGYPTIAN FORCE TRAPPED ON SOUTHER END OF EAST BANK HAD NOT COME UP AND SOURCE HAD NO IDEA HOW THAT WOULD BE HANDLED. HE WONDERED IF RED CROSS MIGHT NOT DEAL WITH IT.

8. UNTSO HAS ALERTED NEW YORK THAT IT MIGHT REQUEST AS MANY AS 45 MORE OBSERVERS TO HANDLE SUEZ FRONT. SOURCE RECALLED THAT INCREASE IN NUMBER OF OBSERVERS TENDS TO RAISE QUESTION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, WHICH COULD BE STICKY. HE ASSUMED, LEAVING THIS PROBLEM ASIDE, THAT ANY NEW OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM NON-NATO COUNTRIES GIVEN EGYPTIAN SENSITIVITIES ON THIS POINT.

9. ON GOLAN FRONT, EIGHT OPERATING OPS ARE STILL IN EFFECT

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MONITORING CEASEFIRE. UNTSU REPRESENTATIVE IN DAMASCUS WAS ALERTED BY SYRIAN LIAISON OFFICER THAT SYRIA MIGHT REQUEST OBSERVERS ALONG ENTIRE FRONT. UNTSU WOULD PROBABLY THEN RE-SHUFFLE SOME OF ITS PRESENT POSTS, TO PROVIDE MORE EVEN COVERAGE WHERE FRONT RUNS ALONG OLD CEASEFIRE LINE, AND USE REMAINDER OF GOLAN OBSERVERS TO COVER ISRAELI SALIENT. SOURCE WAS AWARE THAT OPS HAD NOT CAUGHT SOME OF OCTOBER 23 AIR AND TANK ACTION, AND REALIZED PRESENT DISTRIBUTION MIGHT NOT BE SATISFACTORY EVEN ON OLD LINE. UNTSU MIGHT NOT NEED ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS FOR SYRIAN AREA.

10. COMMENT: AS ISRAELIS HAVE ARRANGED MATTERS, THE ONLY LINE OF OBSERVERS WILL BE ALONG THEIR FARTHEST PERIMETER OF PENETRATION. EGYPTIAN POSTS ON WEST BANK COME THEREFORE TO APPEAR AS ENCLAVES WITHIN CONTINUOUS ISRAELI-HELD TERRITORY ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH. SIZE OF ISRAELI BULGE, WHICH SOURCE DESCRIBED AS IMMENSE, DWARFS EGYPTIAN-HELD AREAS AND FURTHER ADDS TO THIS IMPRESSION. IT IS NOT CLEAR YET WHETHER ISRAELIS REALLY INTEND THIS AS FINAL ARRANGEMENT. PRESUMABLY EGYPTIANS WILL IN ANY CASE CATCH ONTO WHAT ISRAELIS HAVE DONE AND INSIST ON DEMARCATING THEIR EAST BANK LINE AS CEASEFIRE LINE ALSO. NOT TO DO SO WOULD SEEM TO PUT AN STAMP ON ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS. (REPORTED EGYPTIAN ATTACK TOWARD JIDI AND MITLA PASES--TEL AVIV DAI 241255Z--MAY WELL FORCE THIS ISSUED.)
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Wor
24 Oct
Kuwait

ROUTINE
PSA771
DE RUE SKW 1386 2971143
R 241051Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7980

INFO AMEMBASSY ADD DHAHI 1747
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1241
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3391
AMEMBASSY JIPDA 2185
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1626
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0563
AMEMBASSY SARAA 0274
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1741
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0393
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 3808

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PHOR

SUBJECT: KUWAITI REACTION TO CEASE FIRE

SUMMARY: FUNMIN UNDERSEC RASHID CONFIRMED THAT GENERAL
KUWAITI REACTION TO CEASE FIRE WAS FEELING ARABS HAD BEEN SOME-
HOW CHEATED OF FULL SUCCESS. THERE IS ALSO FEELING US IS TRY-
ING TO HUMILIATE ARABS. GOR HAS ADOPTED "WAIT AND SEE"
ATTITUDE RE ME CONFLICT, BUT WILL CONTINUE TO USE ALL ITS CAPABILI-
TIES IN SERVICE OF ARAB CAUSE, INCLUDING ALL ECONOMIC AND POSSIBLY
OTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, RASHID INDICATED GOR HAD NO
RPT NO INTENTIONS BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US. END
SUMMARY.

1. IN CALL ON FUNMINISTRY UNDERSEC RASHID OCT 23 I ASKED HIM HOW
KUWAITIS REACTING TO CEASE FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT. I SAID APPEARED
TO ME POPULACE IN GENERAL CAUGHT BY SURPRISE AT REPIDITY OF CEASE
FIRE AND, IN PROFESSING TO BELIEVE ARABS ACQUITTING THEMSELVES
ADMIRABLY AND AT MINIMUM HOLDING THEIR OWN ON FIELD OF BATTLE,
CONSIDER EGYPTIANS LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS BEFORE WAR AIMS ACHIEVED.
IN SHORT THERE WAS FEELING ARABS CHEATED BY TIPPING OF CEASE FIRE.

2. RASHID SAID HIS READING WAS SAME. IN THEIR PRESENT HIGHLY
EMOTIONAL STATE, HE SAID, SOME PEOPLE TELLING THEMSELVES, THE

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EXAMPLE, THAT IS ADVISED ISRAELI'S CROSS SUEZ CANAL AND HOLD LONG ENOUGH FOR CEASE FIRE TO BE ARRANGED. THIS MAY BEVER IF ORDER TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH STRONGER BARCAINING POSITION. LATER, RASHID REFERRED TO ANOTHER WIDESPREAD FEELING ARABS SHOULD HAVE GONE ON FIGHTING THE MATTER HOW BADLY THEY MIGHT LOSE. FIGHTING LINE INFILTRANCE AND OIL TOOK WITH ME SEVERAL DAYS AGO, RASHID SAID THERE ALSO BITTER FEELING THAT US USING ISRAEL TO HUNTLATE ARABS. SINCE IT SEEMED CONSIDER RELATION WITH ARAB WOULD BE NO CONSEQUENCE, WHY DID NOT US GRAB WHAT IT WANTED FROM ARABS WITH ITS OWN FORCES? HISTORY BOOKS WOULD READ MUCH BETTER FROM VIEW-POINT OF ARABS IF US AS GREAT POWER HAD SUBDUED THEM DIRECTLY RATHER THAN ENGINEERING THEIR DEFEAT TIME AFTER TIME BY THEIR BITTEREST ENEMY.

3. RASHID INDICATED OFFICIAL GOK ATTITUDE WAS BASICALLY ONE OF WAIT AND SEE. EMBARGO ON OIL TO US, AND POSSIBLY OTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO COME, WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE PENDING PROGRESS IN RECOVERY OF ARAB LANDS AND FUTURE OF PALESTINIANS. RASHID WANTED TO EMPHASIZE POINT THAT ARAB "MODERATES" WERE NOT MODERATE ON SUBJECT OF ARAB AIMS; RATHER THEY TRYING TAKE RATIONAL, LONG-RANGE VIEW OF THEIR CAPABILITIES AND WEAPONS THEY REALISTICALLY COULD USE IN SERVICE OF ARAB CAUSE. THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY DOUBT, HE SAID, THAT MODERATES PREPARED TO MAKE ALL SACRIFICES NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT END.

4. RASHID PARKED BY QUESTION AS TO WHAT DEGREE OF PROGRESS IN TALKS ON ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM HE THOUGHT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INDUCE KUWAIT TO RESCIND OIL EMBARGO AND PUT US-KUWAITI RELATIONS BACK ON BETTER FOOTING. HOWEVER, RASHID SAID, NO MATTER HOW "CARE" US-ARAB REALTIONS BECAME, KUWAITIS KNEW THEY COULD NOT STOP OIL AND GET OFF, AND THEREFORE IT HAD NO SENSE TO CUT COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY SUCH IMPORTANT PART OF WORLD.

5. RASHID TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF MY CALL TO REITERATE GOK DETERMINATION TO ITS UTMOST TO KEEP KUWAIT A SAFE PLACE FOR EVERYONE INCLUDING AMERICANS.

6. COMMENT: FROM RASHID'S COMMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF CABINET LEVEL OFFICIALS I HAVE TALKED TO SINCE OCT 6, I AM CONVINCED GOK AT NO TIME DURING CRISIS THUS FAR HAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US. NEVERTHELESS KUWAITIS ARE KEENLY AWARE DURING BEST OF TIMES OF THEIR VULNERABILITY AS MODERATES TO REDICAL AREA AND LOCAL FORCES, ESPECIALLY IRAQI AND PALESTINIAN; AND CRISIS HAS GREATLY INCREASED THEIR FEARS. IN THEIR CURRENT DEPRESSED MOOD, THEY SEE MAJOR GAINS AHEAD FOR USSR IN AREA AT EXPENSE OF US. (THEY DO NOT SEEM AWARE CHINESE MAY BE GREATEST LONG-TERM WINNER). HOW FAR UP HOW PERMANENTLY US BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN KUWAIT (TOTALING WELL OVER ONE BILLION DOLLARS BEFORE OCT 6) HAVE ERODED REMAINS TO BE SEEN. ?

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PAGE 02

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Wor
24 Oct

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
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DE RUEHDT #4156 2970325
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FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0443

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3665
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4479
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4263
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8173
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9265
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4647
USINT CAIRO 3518
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2095

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNSC - late 10/23
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 4156

F.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF

SUBJ: SC RESOLUTION CONFIRMING ME CEASEFIRE

SUMMARY. SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ONE OF STORMIEST SESSIONS

SINCE COLD WAR. AS CHINA AND USSR TRADED INSULTS DURING

DEBATE ON RESOLUTION CONFIRMING MIDDLE EAST CEASEFIRE.

BURDEN OF CHINA'S COMPLAINT WAS THAT SUPER-POWER CONSPONSORS

OF RES HAD RUSHED IT THROUGH WITHOUT GIVING SC MEMBERS CHANCE

FOR HOLDING CONSULTATIONS OR OBTAINING INSTRUCTIONS, AND WERE

USING COUNCIL AS RUBBER STAMP FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. WHILE

SOME NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS DEPLORED LACK OF TIME FOR CONSULTA-

TIONS, THERE WAS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF NEED FOR PROMPT

ACTION. EGYPT AND ISRAEL BLAMED EACH OTHER FOR VIOLATING

CEASEFIRE, BUT NEITHER THEY NOR MOST SC MEMBERS OPPOSED

SUBSTANCE OF RES. UNSYG SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY DISPATCH

UN OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE CEASEFIRE, BUT CAUTIONED THAT HE WOULD

PROBABLY NEED MORE MEN TO DO JOB PROPERLY. END SUMMARY.

1. ISRAELI AMB TEKDAH SPOKE FIRST AFTER EGYPTIAN FM MIN
ZAYYAT, WHO HAD CALLED MEETING, ASKED TO DEFER HIS STATEMENT
UNTIL AFTER VOTE. TEKDAH ACCUSED EGYPT OF CONTINUING ATTACKS
IN VIOLATION OF CEASEFIRE. HE ITEMIZED CEASEFIRE BREACHES,
CLAIMING EGYPTIAN ARTILLERY AND BAZOOKA FIRE WAS CONTINUING
EVEN NOW IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ. ISRAELI FORCES HAD

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PAGE 01

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BEEN ORDER TO RETURN FIRE. ISRAEL, HOWEVER, WAS STILL PREPARED TO STOP FIGHTING AS SOON AS EGYPT DID. FOR ISRAEL, "INDISPENSABLE CONDITION" OF ANY CEASEFIRE WAS RETURN OF ALL POW'S.

2. US INTRODUCED DRAFT RES, RESERVING RIGHT TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE AFTER VOTE. (AMB SCALI'S STATEMENT TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.)

3. USSR'S AMB MALIK, AFTER BRIEF EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, PROPOSED DRAFT RES BE IMMEDIATELY PUT TO VOTE. AT THIS POINT CHINESE DEP FONMIN CHIAO INTERVENED TO SAY CHINA WOULD NOT ALLOW SUPER POWERS TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON COUNCIL WITHOUT PERMITTING DEBATE ON RES WHICH HAD NOT EVEN BEEN TRANSLATED IN ALL LANGUAGES. CHIAO, SAID UN WAS NOT A TOOL TO BE MANIPULATED BY US AND USSR, TO BE JUGGLED IN UTTER DISREGARD OF OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS. AFTER INCREASINGLY HEATED EXCHANGES BETWEEN CHINESE AND SOVIET DELS, SC PRES MCINTYRE ADJOURNED SESSION FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES TO PERMIT TEMPER'S TO COOL. WHEN COUNCIL RESUMED, USSR DID NOT PRESS ITS REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE VOTE AND CHINA COMPLETED ITS COMMENTS ON SUBSTANCE OF RES. ESSENTIALLY THESE WERE THAT RES WAS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AND DEMAND RETURN TO JUNE 1967 BOUNDARIES. IT WAS, MOREOVER, EVEN MORE AMBIGUOUS THAN SC RES 242 AND WAS IN SHORT A FRAUD THAT WOULD SOLVE NO PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE OPPOSED TO IT, CHINA WOULD NOT VETO IT OUT OF RESPECT FOR PARTIES CONCERNED.

4. FOLLOWING VOTE, UK SAID IT SUPPORTED RES BECAUSE IT WAS CLEAR FURTHER ACTION WAS URGENTLY REQUIRED. IT WELCOMED DISPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE CEASEFIRE AND BELIEVED NUMBER OF OBSERVERS MIGHT WELL HAVE TO BE INCREASED. UK SAW NO OBJECTION TO SYG TAKING ACTION TO THIS END, AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ADVICE OF UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF.

5. AT THIS STAGE SOVIET AMB MALIK MADE ANOTHER HANDLING STATE, LARGELY IN RESPONSE TO CHINESE. ONE SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT WAS WARNING TO ISRAEL BY SOVIET GOVT OF "SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES INVOLVED IN CONTINUATION OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVTS."

6. FRENCH DEL ALSO SAID IT BELIEVED RES RESPONDED TO IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF SITUATION. SYG MUST BE AUTHORIZED TO SET UP URGENTLY THE NEEDED MECHANISM AND PROBABLY WOULD NEED TO BE AUTHORIZED TO SEND ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS.

7. SYG SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF TO HOLD OBSERVERS IN READINESS FOR TYPE OF OPERATION CONTEMPLATED IN RES'S PARA TWO. HE REQUESTED COOPERATION

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PAGE 02

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OF PARTIES AND SAID HE EXPECTED HE WOULD HAVE TO INCREASE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS. AT CLOSE OF MEETING, SYG ANNOUNCED THAT UNTSO CHIEF OF STAFF HAD ALREADY REPORTED THAT AS FIRST STEP THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, ISMAILIA, IN COOPERATION WITH EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES, WOULD DEPLOY IMMEDIATELY THREE OBSERVED TEAMS, ONE IN NORTHERN SECTOR, ONE IN CENTRAL SECTOR, AND ONE IN SOUTHERN SECTOR. ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN INFORMED AND CHIEF OF STAFF WAS DISCUSSING WITH THEM SIMILAR OPERATIONS BASED ON KANTARA FOR THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE CANAL.

8. EGYPTIAN FOMIN ZAYYAT SAID EGYPTIAN TARGETS REMAINED SIMPLE: LIBERATION OF ARAB TERRITORY AND RESTORATION OF RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. ZAYYAT CONTINUED THAT END TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION WAS SINE QUA NON OF PEACE AND EGYPT EXPECTED SUPER POWERS TO ENSURE ISRAELI RETURN OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY. EGYPT ALSO EXPECTED THAT PARA ONE OF SC RES JUST ADOPTED WOULD BE CARRIED OUT TO LETTER, THAT IS, ALL FORCES WOULD BE RETURNED TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED AT MOMENT CEASEFIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0437

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3663
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4477
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4261
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8169
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9262
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4445
USINT CAIRO 3516
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2093

UNCLAS USUN 4149

F.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF
SUBJ: US STATEMENT ON SC RESOLUTION CONFIRMING THE
CEASEFIRE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMB SCALI'S STATEMENT TO
SC OCT 23 AFTER COUNCIL'S ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION
CONFIRMING MF CEASEFIRE (SEPTFL):
MR. PRESIDENT, I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT ON RECORD MY DELEGATION'S
DEEP REGRET THAT OUR PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED BY
UNFORTUNATE DISORDER. I WISH ALSO TO COMPLIMENT OUR DISTINGUISHED
PRESIDENT, AMBASSADOR MCINTYRE, FOR HIS PATIENT EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN
AND RESTORE ORDER IN THE CHAMBER. THIS WRANGLE WAS PARTICULARLY
REGRETTABLE BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE ISSUE BEFORE US.
THE ISSUE IS PEACE AND WHILE WE SPEAK MEN ARE DYING.
MY DELEGATION, FOR ITS PART, WAS PREPARED TO ALLOW THE
DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO SPEAK. WE DID NOT BELIEVE
HE WOULD SPEAK AN UNREASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THE ISSUE HAS BEEN
RESOLVED AND WE FERVENTLY HOPE THAT WE MAY BE SPARED FURTHER
INTERRUPTIONS IN THE FUTURE.
MR. PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS JOINED WITH THE SOVIET
UNION IN INTRODUCING THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL
BECAUSE OF ITS CONCERN THAT THE CEASE FIRE ORDERED BY THE COUNCIL
ON OCTOBER 22 BE MADE FULLY EFFECTIVE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
MOMENT.
THERE HAVE BEEN CHARGES FROM EACH SIDE OF VIOLATIONS ALLEGEDLY

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COMMITTED BY THE OTHER. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT TO DETERMINE THE ACCURACY OF THESE CHARGES. NO THIRD PARTY EVIDENCE FROM AN OBJECTIVE SOURCE IS AVAILABLE TO US. THE RESOLUTION BEFORE US CONFIRMS THE COUNCIL'S DECISION OF OCTOBER 22 IN AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ALL KINDS OF FIRING AND OF ALL MILITARY ACTION AND URGES THAT THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES BE RETURNED TO THE POSITION THEY OCCUPIED AT THE MOMENT THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. THE RESOLUTION ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TAKE MEASURES TO DISPATCH UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS IMMEDIATELY TO SUPERVISE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE, INCLUDING PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE IN CAIRO. WE CONSIDER THE CENTRAL FEATURES OF THE RESOLUTION TO BE THOSE IN WHICH THE COUNCIL CONFIRMS ITS POSITION FOR A CEASE FIRE AND IN WHICH IT PROVIDES FOR THE STATIONING OF OBSERVERS BETWEEN THE FORCES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT. THE FORMER PROVISION WILL PUT AN END TO BLOODSHED; THE LATTER WILL RESULT IN THE CREATION OF A CLEAR LINE OF DEMARCATION SEPARATING THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. WE HAVE AGREED, FOR REASONS OF PRINCIPLE, WITH THE PROVISION OF THE RESOLUTION URGING THE FORCES TO RETURN TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED WHEN THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. WE PUT FORWARD THE PRINCIPLE OF RETURN TO POSITIONS OCCUPIED BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT IN A STATEMENT I MADE IN THIS CHAMBER ON OCTOBER 8. AT THAT TIME THE PRINCIPLES DID NOT RECEIVE THE SUPPORT FROM THE COUNCIL. CONSISTENT WITH OUR ARGUMENT AT THAT TIME, WE AGREE TODAY THAT FORCES SHOULD RETURN TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED AT THE TIME THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. BUT WE MUST POINT OUT THAT THERE WILL BE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING ACTUAL CEASE FIRE LINES AND IN FIXING THE POSITIONS OF FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN MANEUVERING IN THE DESERT. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL NOT BECOME OUR CENTRAL PREOCCUPATION AS WE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS RESUME AT ONCE THE FUNCTION OF OBSERVATION OF THE FORCES OF THE PARTIES. FORTUNATELY, THE UNITED NATIONS HAS IN THE AREA OFFICERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, WHO CAN PROCEED QUICKLY TO THE CEASE FIRE AREA. ON THE PASSAGE OF THIS RESOLUTION, WE WOULD EXPECT THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, TO PUT OBSERVERS IN PLACE AT ONCE, AND TO RECEIVE IMMEDIATELY REPORTS FROM THEM ON EVENTS IN THE AREAS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THESE REPORTS SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FORTHWITH. FINALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WE MUST LOOK TO THE FUTURE. OUR PARAMOUNT TASK IS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE AND TO HALT THE BLOODSHED. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN GIVE PROMPT CONSIDERATION TO THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET RESOLUTION, AS IT HAS, SO THAT THE FIGHTING MAY BE STOPPED AND NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN LOOKING TOWARD A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

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PAGE 02

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TU SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0438

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3604
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4478
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4262
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8170
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9263
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4646
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3517
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2094

UNCLAS USUN 4150

P.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF

SUBJ: SC RESOLUTION CONFIRMING ME CEASEFIRE
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ME RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY SC
AFTERNOON OCT 23 BY VOTE OF 14-0-0, CHINA NOT
PARTICIPATING:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REFERRING TO ITS RESOLUTION 338 (1973) OF 22 OCT 1973,

1. CONFIRMS ITS DECISION ON AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION
OF ALL KINDS OF FIRING AND OF ALL MILITARY ACTION, AND URGES
THAT THE FORCES BE RETURNED TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED
AT THE MOMENT THE CEASEFIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE;

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO TAKE MEASURES
FOR IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO
SUPERVISE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE
FORCES OF ISRAEL AND THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, USING
FOR THIS PURPOSE THE PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOW
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND FIRST OF ALL THE PERSONNEL NOW IN
CAIRO.

SCALI

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PRIORITY
ESA6288IA936
DE RUE\$BI #1454 1271054
P 241004Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1057

INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1270
AMEMBASSY JIPDA PRIORITY 0319
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0556

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 1454

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFUP, TC, US

SUBJ: ZAYID CONTINUES BOYCOST AGAINST U.S.

SUMMARY: UAE PRES. SHEIKH ZAYID CONTINUES TO SPEAK OF POSSIBLE FURTHER MEASURES AGAINST US. ZAYID CLEARLY ENJOYING SOUND OF HIS OWN WORDS AND POSITION OF PROMINENCE HE FEELS HE HAS ACHIEVED IN ARAB WORLD. HAVING EXPENDED OIL WEAPON WITH DEBUT HASTE, HIS CURRENT VERBOSITY AND LACK OF SOPHISTICATED MAKE HIM HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO PRESSURES GENERATED BY EVENTS AND HIS ADVISORS, SOME OF WHOM ARE NON-UAE ARABS, FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FURTHER ECONOMIC STEPS AGAINST US INTERESTS IN THE UAE. END SUMMARY.

1. LOCAL MEDIA CONTINUED OCT 23 CARRY STATEMENTS OF UAE PRES./ABU DHABI RULER SHEIKH ZAYID CONCERNING POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL MEASURES AGAINST US INTERESTS IN UAE. ZAYID SPOKE BY PHONE EVENING OCT 22 WITH PRES ASAD OF SYRIA AND PROMISED CONTINUED UAE SUPPORT FOR ANY DECISION TAKEN BY FRONT-LINE STATES.

2. SAME EVENING, UAE FEDERAL COUNCIL MET IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION AND CALLED FOR MAINTENANCE OF OIL EMPARGO ON US AND EXTENSION MEASURES TO COVER ALL ECONOMIC FIELDS. COUNCIL REPORTEDLY URGED THAT ARABS SHOULD WITHDRAW ALL FUNDS FROM AMERICAN BANKS AND BOYCOTT ALL US PRODUCTS UNTIL OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS ARE REGAINED.

3. INDEPENDENT DAILY AL-WAHDA PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH ZAYID ON OCT 22 IN WHICH HE STATED QUOTE WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BOYCOTT THE EXPORT OF OIL TO THE US UNTIL SIT-

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Wor
24 Oct
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(he is on
visits list)

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UATION DEVELOPS, WHEN WE SHALL DECIDE OUR NEXT STEP IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR DUTY AND WITH WHAT IS REQUESTED OF US BY OUR BROTHERS IN EGYPT AND SYRIA END QUOTE. COMMENTING ON FURTHER ECONOMIC STEPS AGAINST US, ZAYID SAID "IF US CONTINUES ITS SUPPORT FOR OUR ENEMY, WE SHALL TAKE FURTHER STEPS AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS IN OUR COUNTRY."

4. COMMENT: ZAYID, WHO HAS APPARENTLY BEEN SEEKING AN OPENING TO MAKE A NAME FOR HIMSELF IN THE ARAB WORLD, SEEMS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HE HAS FOUND ONE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HIS FEELINGS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION ARE INTENSE, BUT THIS ALONE CANNOT EXPLAIN THE LEADING ROLE HE IS INTENT UPON PLAYING. TWO OTHER FACTORS ALSO MERIT CONSIDERATION. FIRST, ALTHOUGH ZAYID HAS WORN DOWN SOME OF THE ROUGH EDGES OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, HE REMAINS RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED. IN PUBLIC ENCOUNTERS WITH THE PRESS, HE IS EASILY BAITED AND OUTMANEUVERED AND COULD BE LED SOMEWHAT BEYOND THE POSITION HE MIGHT WISH TO STAKE OUT FOR HIMSELF AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT. HAVING BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE PROCESS OF DENYING OIL TO THE US, HE HAS SHOT HIS BIG GUN AND THEREFORE MUST CONTINUE SEARCH FOR AN ENCORE. PERHAPS, A WISER OR MORE EXPERIENCED POLITICIAN WOULD HAVE SOUGHT IN THIS SITUATION TO LIMIT THE OCCASIONS ON WHICH HE IS FORCED TO MAKE COMMENTS, BUT THE LURE OF PUBLIC EXPOSURE OVERWHELMS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. SECONDLY, ZAYID IS, FROM ALL EVIDENCE WOEFULLY IGNORANT OF THE SITUATION ON THE FRONT LINES. IN ONE RECENT PRESS STATEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, HE CONTINUED TO HAMMER THE LONG-ABANDONED ARAB POINT THAT ISRAEL INITIATED CURRENT HOSTILITIES. FURTHERMORE, WE CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT ZAYID IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED OF THE VERACITY OF ARAB MEDIA ACCOUNTS OF THE FIGHTING AND HAS NO IDEA HOW PRECARIOUS THE POSITION IS ON BOTH FRONTS. DOUBT ALSO THAT ADVICE HE RECEIVING FROM ADNAN PACHACHI AND OTHER NORTHERN ARABS HAS DONE MUCH TO ADD TO CLARITY OF HIS THOUGHT PROCESSES.

5. DANGER WITH ZAYID IS THAT, HAVING MADE VERBAL COMMITMENTS TO CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION, HE WILL BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO SUGGESTIONS THAT HE HAS NOT CARRIED THROUGH. IN SUCH CASES, ZAYID COULD MOUNT HIS CHARGE ONCE AGAIN AND SEEK REGAIN LEADERSHIP ROLE BY DECREEDING FURTHER ROUND OF MEASURES AGAINST US INTERESTS.

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PSN:016622 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:297/11:51Z DTG:241004Z OCT 73

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DP IMMED /ROUTINE
ESA452RAA688
DE RUEKRA #4684 2970815
O R 240746Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TU SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5288

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0153
USINT ALGIERS 0243
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2024
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4657
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS 0131
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 6055
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2050
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2699
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0325
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 098
USMISSION OECD PARIS 842
AMEMBASSY ROME 465
AMEMBASSY SANAA 758
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 682
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 083
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 603
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 333
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 060

245

C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 4684

EXDIS
DEPT PASS CAIRO; BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
EO 11652: GUS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, XF
SUBJ: SAUDI INCOME TO INCREASE ONE BILLION DOLLARS
REF: JIDDA 4652
SUMMARY: DESPITE A 25-PERCENT CUTBACK IN PRODUCTION (REFTEL)
INCLUDING A TOTAL EMBARGO ON SHIPMENTS TO U.S. AND OFFSHORE
REFINERIES FOR U.S. MARKET, SAG WILL ACTUALLY INCREASE ITS
NET CURRENT INCOME BY MORE THAN FOUR MILLION DOLLARS A DAY.
IF THIS LEVEL SHOULD HOLD FOR FULL YEAR, SAG'S SURPLUS OVER
PRESENT SPENDING RATE WOULD MEAN A CONTINUED GROWTH IN RESERVES
TO \$8 BILLION AND INCREASED ABILITY
TO SUSTAIN PAYMENTS TO ARAB
CONFRONTATION STATES. END SUMMARY.

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

QUANDT, KNUREL, HSR

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1. QUICK CALCULATIONS JUST FOR THE RECORD, IN CASE ADDRESSEES FEEL SAUDI ARABIA MAY HAVE TO CURB ITS SUPPORT FOR ARAB CONFEDERATION STATES, INDICATE THAT SAG WILL BEGIN EARNING NET OF EACH BARREL OF OIL PRODUCED UNDER NEW OPEC GULF FORMULA MORE THAN THREE DOLLARS. THIS MEANS AT PROGRAMMED 6.0 MILLION BPS LEVEL SET FOR COMING WEEKS UNTIL DECEMBER 1 THAT SAG WILL EARN CLOSE TO \$20 MILLION A DAY, FOUR TO FIVE MILLION MORE THAN BEFORE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT OUTBACK AND IMPOSE PRICE RISE.]
2. WITH SPENDING RATES EVEN IN SEMI-WAR STATE OF ECURITY PROBABLY NOT EXCEEDING IN ANY CASE EIGHT TO TEN MILLION DOLLARS A DAY, HOLDING THE OUTBACK TO PRESENT LEVELS FOR WHOLE YEAR WOULD MEAN THAT SAG ALONE COULD INCREASE ITS EXPECTED REVENUES BY WELL OVER \$4 BILLION TO \$8 BILLION, OR PROVIDE MASSIVE FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO CONFEDERATION STATES.]
3. FURTHER PRODUCTION CUTBACKS AS THREATENED AT THE FIVE-PERCENT-A-MONTH RATE UNTIL ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WOULD OF COURSE DRASTICALLY MODIFY THIS EQUATION, BUT THE PRICE LEVELS WOULD SURFLY RISE AGAIN IF SUCH CUTBACKS WERE IMPOSED.

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PSN:016527 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:297/09:30Z DTG:240746Z OCT 73

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